For more than seven decades, European security rested on one basic assumption: that the United States would be the ultimate guarantor of the continent’s defense. From NATO’s inception to the present day, American military power has served as the cornerstone of deterrence against any potential adversary, whether it was the Soviet Union during the Cold War or Russia today.
Today, however, this assumption is being challenged as never before.
Why has this discussion been opened?
The return of great power competition, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing American focus on the Indo-Pacific have rekindled a question that until recently was considered almost academic: what would happen if Europe had to defend itself without the American military presence?
According to yesterday’s New York Times report, the US is already planning to reduce NATO’s fighters, ships and military capabilities in Europe
“Historically there has been an over-reliance on American forces and capabilities,” NATO spokeswoman Alison Hart told Reuters, adding that as Europe and Canada invest more in defense and develop greater military capabilities, the distribution of responsibilities may change.
It said in a written statement that this development will strengthen NATO’s defenses, reducing reliance on a single ally and reflecting a broader change already underway within the Alliance.
Despite a significant increase in defense spending in recent years, European defense is still heavily dependent on American capabilities. This dependence is not limited to troops or weapon systems. It spans satellite intelligence, early warning capabilities, strategic aviation, missile defense, command and control infrastructure, and nuclear deterrence.
Simply put, Europe has strong militaries, but it still relies on Washington for many of the critical functions that make it possible to wage a high-intensity war.
The Russia factor
The problem becomes even more complex when viewed in light of the Russian threat.
Despite the massive losses it has suffered in Ukraine, Russia continues to possess significant military capabilities. Its economy has adjusted to wartime production rates, its defense industry operates in a state of constant mobilization, and its military leadership has gained valuable experience from a large-scale war.
This means that Europe cannot afford to think it has a decade to prepare. Many analysts estimate that Russia could regain a significant portion of its conventional capabilities within the next few years, creating new pressures on NATO’s eastern borders.
This is precisely where the biggest European challenge emerges.
The continent is not only facing a spending problem. He faces a timing problem.
Even if European governments decided tomorrow to allocate the necessary resources, building the required military capabilities would take years. The construction of fighter jets, warships, anti-aircraft systems and submarines cannot be sped up by political pronouncements or emergency funding like SAFE.
Europe’s defense industry remains fragmented, with different national programs, limited production lines and significant shortages of skilled personnel. Most countries increased orders for munitions and land systems after 2022, but investment in aeronautical capabilities remains insufficient relative to needs.
The result is a paradox:
Europe has an overall population larger than that of the United States, an economy of comparable scale, and a high-level technological base. However, it struggles to translate these advantages into cohesive military power.
The political cost and delays
The issue is not only financial. It’s political.
During the Cold War, many European countries consistently spent more than 3% of their GDP on defense. Today, even reaching the 2% target is still a challenge for many governments, while the new target is 5% (3.5% in weapon systems and 1.5% in defense investment).
The transition to a truly autonomous European defense would likely require levels of spending not seen in decades.
The question is whether European societies are willing to accept this cost.
The debate takes on even greater importance as the United States redefines its global priorities. Regardless of who is in the White House, the strategic reality remains the same: Washington sees China as the most important long-term challenge to its interests.
This does not necessarily mean American withdrawal from Europe. But it does mean that Europeans can no longer take for granted the American presence at the level they knew in previous decades.
The French proposal for a broader European dialogue around nuclear deterrence, German initiatives to increase defense investment and the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its industrial base are signs that the debate has already begun.
However, building strategic autonomy is not the work of a few years.
It requires political continuity, industrial mobilization and, above all, a shared threat perception. Without this evidence, European capitals risk investing billions of euros without creating a truly coherent deterrent.
The biggest challenge, after all, isn’t buying more guns. Here they cannot agree on what kind of weapons they want, as the recent fiasco of the proposed Franco-German fighter 6 showed usher Generation FCAS.
It is the creation of a Europe that will be able to take strategic decisions and support them with the means required for their implementation.
For seventy-five years, American power filled this void. Today, as the international system becomes increasingly unstable and competitive, Europeans are asked to answer a fundamental question: can they take responsibility for their own security?
The answer will not only determine the future of NATO. It will also determine the future of Europe as a geopolitical factor in the 21st century.
