Brazil tends to look at its institutional crises as if they were permanent. Recent experience shows something different: institutions can be rebuilt when there is political leadership and cooperation between the State and society.
In the early 2000s, Espírito Santo experienced a moment of profound institutional fragility. Extreme episodes, such as , exposed the presence of and cast doubt on the ability of public authorities to fully exercise their authority. Companies left or created dependencies on tax incentives decided within the Assembly, in a casual manner, undermining the state’s tax collection capacity.
Those events revealed a broader problem: weakened institutions, low coordination between public bodies and an environment of uncertainty that compromised the trust of society and investors.
What came after, however, deserves to be remembered.
From that moment on, Espírito Santo began a consistent process of institutional reconstruction. Over time, a set of structural changes was consolidated that combined fiscal discipline, improved public governance and strengthening security policies.
The first pillar of this reconstruction was the rebalancing of public accounts. The state adopted a fiscal adjustment strategy based on spending control, administrative reorganization and strengthening financial management. The predictability of public accounts goes beyond an accounting indicator. It defines the State’s capacity to plan, invest and respond to crises. By recovering fiscal discipline, Espírito Santo also rebuilt the credibility of its management.
This agenda was led by the then governor, . Since his experience as mayor of Vitória, he maintained that the balance of public accounts represented the central pillar for the construction of a strategic State, capable of planning, investing and executing public policies effectively, improving people’s lives. The actions were harsh, but they allowed the return of regular payment of civil servants’ salaries.
It is for people — not just for some groups — that the State exists.
The second pillar was improving public governance. Planning, transparency, strengthening of institutional control and coordination bodies began to occupy a central place in state administration. The professionalization of management and the clear definition of priorities strengthened the capacity to execute public policies and increased the State’s efficiency. Espírito Santo knew its advantages, opportunities and the weaknesses it needed to attack. What escaped this vision did not enter the wake of government action.
The third pillar was the strengthening of the State’s institutional presence in the field of security and Justice. The fight against required integration between the Executive, Judiciary, Public Ministry and police forces. The joint effort reestablished the authority of the institutions and reinforced confidence that the rules would once again be respected.
But there is an aspect that is often less remembered in this process: the role of society.
The institutional reconstruction of Espírito Santo included the active engagement of business leaders and civil society organizations. Initiatives such as the “Holy Spirit in Action” movement helped to formulate long-term agendas and strengthen a culture of strategic planning, with the participation of churches, religious leaders and the OAB. They brought protagonism to the leaders, who were previously defensive in a degraded environment.
Throughout this process, a true public-private coalition was formed in the state around common objectives, involving increasingly broader social spectrums: improving the quality of public management, regaining trust in institutions and establishing more solid foundations for development.
The results came gradually. Espírito Santo has consolidated one of the most solid fiscal situations among Brazilian states. The improvement of the institutional environment helped to attract investments and reposition the state in strategic sectors, such as logistics, industry and foreign trade. And services expanded.
Something equally important was happening. Little by little, the sense of belonging and trust in the State’s capacity was rebuilt. The reconstruction of institutions gave society confidence again that the State could function again, comply with rules and offer prospects for the future.
I participated in part of this process. Experience has proven that institutions rebuild themselves slowly, with fiscal discipline, difficult decisions and commitment to rules that need to apply to everyone. And public leadership committed to this process is essential.
Today, I return to Espírito Santo and see local companies thriving, expanding their borders to other states and other countries, helping to create new learning and innovation ecosystems. But vigilance over this process needs to be permanent. This is not something linear or immune to the forces of capture, crime and corruption, which are always lurking.
In a country that often emphasizes its institutional crises, it is worth remembering experiences of successful reconstruction. The case of Espírito Santo is an example, which was also inspired by tested and well-evaluated experiences from other states and other countries. There was no need to reinvent the wheel, but it was an intensive process in good management.
The Espírito Santo case shows that economic development depends, above all, on the quality of the institutions that organize public life. Natural resources and geographic advantages expand opportunities. Strong institutions create the conditions to transform them into lasting prosperity. And, as the Espírito Santo experience shows, they can be rebuilt when there is discipline and commitment.
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