For Bardella, whose political mentor Marine Le Pen spent years trying to purge the party of her father Jean-Marie Le Pen’s anti-Semitism, it was a red line that could not be crossed. Bannon then called Bardella profanity, adding that he was “a boy, not a man.” Paradoxically, this conflict helped Bardell at home – he showed French voters that the RN no longer wanted to be a political extreme.
Russia as a multidimensional threat
However, this emancipation from the old identity is met with resistance within the party. In his quest for the presidential seat, Bardella decided to definitively cut ties with the party’s past associated with the pro-Kremlin image. Today, Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin is bluntly described as a “multidimensional threat” that carries out “direct aggression against French and European interests”.
However, this attitude, shaped by his young advisers, provokes sharp conflicts with the old guard loyal to Marine Le Pen, who would rather stick to the traditional concept of non-engagement and “pacifism”. In addition, the generational clash is also deepening in the economic field – Bardella, under the influence of business elites, is starting to push for fiscal discipline and is reconsidering the populist promise to lower the retirement age to 62, which Le Pen’s wing perceives as a betrayal of their key working-class voters.
Italian precedent
Today, although Bardella rejects Trump’s support from the position of opposition leader, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni did so directly from the Prime Minister’s chair. For many years, Meloni was seen as Donald Trump’s most stable European ally. In 2018, she even hosted the aforementioned Steve Bannon as a guest of honor at her political conference, and Trump’s son or Vice President JD Vance wrote forewords to her recent autobiographies.
But after Trump’s return to power, the strategic partnership turned into a nightmare. The war in Iran unexpectedly brought a critical turning point. The United States and Israel started military operations without any consultation with their European partners. Rome subsequently banned US military aircraft heading to the Middle East from using the Sigonella base in Sicily at the end of March.
However, the biggest criticism came from the voters themselves. They have fully felt the economic consequences of Trump’s military policy. Italy, which imported about 10 percent of its natural gas from Qatar, was hit hard by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s counterattacks on Qatari refineries.
The subsequent price shock is also related to this. The price of diesel in Italy has soared above two euros a liter, understandably angering conservative voters who form the core of Meloni’s support. Moreover, according to YouGov polls, up to 80 percent of Italians expressed a negative attitude towards Donald Trump.
Attacking the Pope as an excuse to back out
When Meloni lost a key referendum on judicial reform in March 2026, in which 54 percent of voters voted against, she took the results as a sign that voters saw it as a vote on her government. It was negatively associated with the economic effects of Trump’s war. Therefore, Meloni needed an escape route – and the American president provided it himself.
When Pope Leo XIV. publicly condemned the war in the Middle East, saying about a “handful of tyrants”, Trump responded with an attack on social networks, calling the head of the Catholic Church “weak”. For Meloni, the leader of a country where more than half the population professes Catholicism, it was the perfect moment to break up. She immediately called Trump’s statements unacceptable.
Trump countered that Meloni was suddenly “a completely different person”, but the Prime Minister further supported her new stance with a statement that today defines the new European right: “Being allies does not mean that there are no red lines, and it certainly does not mean being vassals or subjects.”
Italy never begs
If it seemed that the split after the attack on the Pope was final, the G7 summit in Évian, France in June made relations even worse. The American president humiliated the Italian prime minister by claiming that she “begged” him for a photo together at the summit and took a picture with her only because he “felt sorry for her”. In addition, he added on the Truth Social social network that Meloni is losing popularity because she did not help the US in the war with Iran, and now she wants to make friends again just to “raise her numbers”.
In response, Meloni called Trump’s claims “completely fabricated” and sent a strong message to Washington on Instagram: “I and Italy never beg.” She publicly advised the ex-partner to take care of his own popularity, because being friends with him at home definitely did not help her. At the same time, the Italian Prime Minister expressed surprise at why the American president behaves this way towards his own allies.
This incident, paradoxically, helped Meloni and closed the otherwise divided Italian political scene. Not only coalition partners such as Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, but also opposition leaders, including former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, took her side. According to him, Italy does not deserve to be humiliated like this. The result of this shootout is the cancellation of the planned trip of Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani to the USA.
Old vs. the new right
While until 2024 the old model characterized by uncritical admiration dominated, the year 2026 brought a change. While in the past European nationalists sought the closest possible ideological alliance with Trump’s Washington and took over American culture wars in their campaigns, today they keep their distance from the White House. In the foreground is the emphasis on national sovereignty and the rejection of any American interference in European politics.
This shift is particularly significant in security and trade issues. In the past, threats to withdraw from NATO were part of the rhetoric of most of these politicians. Currently, however, the same leaders emphasize building their own European defense capabilities. Specifically, France does not hide its ambition to gradually replace the United States in the role of guarantor of security on the continent.
This rhetoric is gradually shaping the relationship with Brussels – instead of threats to leave the EU (the so-called Frexit), which he definitively swept off the table, Bardella wants to paralyze the union from within. His plan to reduce the financial contribution to the EU coffers by half is supposed to work on the principle of rebates, such as those won by Germany or the Netherlands in the past.
The attitude towards the Middle East also underwent a huge change. Especially in the West, a critical approach that reflects the mood of the electorate is more popular. In practice, this means open condemnation of the American-Israeli conflict with Iran or the freezing of the automatic renewal of strategic military contracts with Tel Aviv, as happened in Italy.
The instinct of self-preservation
Behind this diplomatic rift is, among other things, an effort to survive politically. In April 2026, Viktor Orbán lost the elections in Hungary – despite the last-minute personal support of US Vice President JD Vance.
After losing a key ally in Hungary, Meloni is facing elections in 2027 and must move her politics into the center-right European mainstream. It needs to build alliances, including with European institutions it once criticized.
Bardella faces the same challenges. In July, Marine Le Pen is in danger of having her conviction for embezzlement confirmed, which would make it impossible for her to run in the presidential elections in 2027. The National Association will probably lead Bardella into the battle for the Elysee Palace. If he wins, he will take control of the EU’s second largest economy and the union’s only nuclear power.
In times of war, treaty frameworks do not change
To appease centrist voters, Bardella is reviving traditional French Gaullism. “We have General de Gaulle to thank for preventing the hosting of American bases in France, because that is what keeps us a free country,” Bardella explains of his vision.
Instead of relying on the American defense umbrella, he is advocating that the French defense industry offer a security and weapons alternative to the European states, which, in his words, are today “confused by the American president”.
He declares that France will not leave NATO’s integrated command for the time being. “We do not want to leave this command while war is at Europe’s door. In time of war, treaty frameworks do not change,” he declared. Under his leadership, France promises to uphold its security obligations towards the eastern wing, but with regard to its own interests. Referring to De Gaulle, he defines that France’s interests related to nuclear deterrence do not end at its borders, but also cover, for example, the Benelux region.
Bardella is no longer heading to Washington, but to building his own axis in Europe. If he takes power in 2027, he plans to form a strong coalition with Meloni, Friedrich Merz’s German Christian Democrats and the Polish right that will force the EU to submit to national interests.
What else connects them?
However, it would be a mistake to assume that there are no gaps left between the European and American right. They continue to share a deep opposition to mass migration. According to Bardell, the American administration’s accusations about migration as the main security threat coincide with the French one.
The era when European conservatives looked to the United States for inspiration is coming to an end. They understood that in the concept of “America First” there is simply no room left for a sovereign Europe.
