On December 2, Minister José Antonio imposed the maximum degree of secrecy on investigations into the . Bad idea, something from the powerful in Brasília. In less than a month, the minister became an arm of the banker’s plots and his intere$$e$ network. With a first class funeral, .
When Toffoli lowered the secrecy and also centralized the course of investigations in his office, he assumed that he commands whoever can and obeys whoever has sense. One question remains: could the setup have worked? Only if they had agreed with . As the legend attributes to the player Garrincha, he failed to combine with the Russians. Not only did it fail to agree, Toffoli defied the Federal Police.
President Lyndon Johnson, a master of American politics, did not want to mess with J. Edgar Hoover, the eternal director of the FBI, the American federal police. He explained: It’s better to have him pissing outside than pissing inside.
Who knows what Toffoli thought, but secrecy became a poison. He took the crisis into the courtroom, right on the days when his .
Secrecy became a barrage of accusations. It is known that the use of secrecy (read censorship) turns into a rumor mill. For example: in 1969 a palace clique blocked details about the health of President Costa e Silva, who had suffered cerebral ischemia. Result: a rumor spread that the marshal was dead.
Secrecy turned Toffoli’s reputation into a wasteland into which anything could be thrown. This was a situation created by him, the product of irrational omnipotence. His style was to double the bets, until he ran out of cards.
Leaving aside the minister’s case, two more horror stories appeared: law firms hired by the Master would be laundering money and Daniel Vorcaro’s arrest would have been leaked. That and the list of powerful people in Brasília involved in one way or another with the fortunate banker.
When the case began, there was a banker and his pomp in the circle. A few months passed, the court itself fell on the track and . What cemented this plot was the damn secrecy.
Basically, Toffoli’s mistake was disrespecting a teaching by Tancredo Neves: in government you don’t sell or buy. You don’t need to be a clairvoyant to predict that the price that Vorcaro’s brother-in-law’s fund paid for the .
Mendonça and his luck
Luck, or lack thereof, During the meeting that sealed the fate of José Antonio Dias Toffoli, he was critical of the Federal Police report. There are enough elements to say that the PF investigated Toffoli without having due authorization from the Court.
“I don’t think this is acceptable, I wouldn’t want this for anyone,” Mendonça said during the meeting.
Okay, in this case your peers should have rejected the Federal Police report.
The line that separates a prerogative from a privilege is thin. If the federal government did not look at Toffoli’s accounts, it could be respecting a prerogative, granting him the privilege of telling the court whatever he wanted.
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