Your password is likely to be more secure than US Cold War nuclear codes

During the height of Cold War tensions, the US nuclear weapons unlock code did not pass today’s requirements for a password: it was 00000000.

The safety of nuclear weapons, particularly during the Cold War, has long been a matter of great concern. Expert revelations reveal that, in some cases, safeguards were shockingly weakeven when the United States was in a climate of great tension with the Soviet Union.

A chilling proposal from Roger Fisher, a Harvard academic, underscores the gravity of nuclear decisions. Writing in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1981, Fisher suggested a unique safeguard: deploy nuclear launch codes next to the heart of a volunteer accompanying the president.

For a launch, the president would have to physically retrieve the codes using a butcher knife, forcing him to face the human cost devastating of your decision. Fisher’s reasoning was to make the decision visceral, in contrast to the detached nature of military verbiage, explains .

However, the Pentagon rejected Fisher’s ideaciting concerns that it could distort the president’s judgment. Ironically, existing safeguards were not without flaws. Nuclear launch procedures required multiple officials and presidential authorization, but the system faced internal resistance to implementing robust safeguards.

Bruce Blair, a nuclear expert and former launch officer, made one of the most surprising claims. Following President John F. Kennedy’s 1962 directive to protect nuclear weapons with codes, Strategic Air Command allegedly circumvented the mandate by setting launch codes to “00000000”.

Blair said that during the 1970s, launch teams were even instructed to check that codes were left at zero, prioritizing speed over safety. The Air Force denied the allegation, stating that such codes were never used. Blair countered with references to technical manuals that supported his claims.

Despite the alarming allegations, no launches were registered unauthorized during this period. In 1977, a more reliable system was introduced that required direct authorization from higher authorities to release codes, strengthening security.

While the stark contrast between Fisher’s imaginative proposal and the alleged laxity of Cold War safeguards is troubling, these episodes underscore the heightened risks and evolving complexities of nuclear command systems.