War in the Middle East: The pressure on Trump and the cracks in the Iranian leadership

War in the Middle East: The pressure on Trump and the cracks in the Iranian leadership

For about one of the two weeks between, the and the , the American president, often thick in his statements, says contradictory things, both about the goals of the war, about its duration, but also about the results so far.

For years, everyone has known that this is part of Trump’s own style, but at this stage, according to relevant reports and information, something else is happening behind the scenes, in his corridors and in the halls of the White House.

Trump is trying to strike a balance between three “factions” of his advisers, all of whom for different reasons are beginning to form different and conflicting approaches to the Iran war, its duration, and what ultimately constitutes a “victory” or success for the US.

Correspondingly, however, it seems that the war, but also the overall stance of the Iranian leadership on a number of issues, deepens the rifts that existed in Tehran, either at the level of political, theocratic and military power, or at the level of the well-known “blocs” of the country’s political life, i.e. between the conservatives and the reformers.

In this context, of course, the debate opens whether a fall of the regime is imminent or not. One of the assessments – at least the one circulating recently – that exists in Washington on the issue of the resilience of the Iranian leadership – as opposed to the assessment of the Israeli leadership – is that the citizens in the country are not ready to overthrow the regime, as was the initial assessment supported by Trump himself.

Three “lines” of advisers around Trump

At least that was Donald Trump’s assessment a few hours ago, it remains to be seen whether the most “pro-war factions” of his advisers will agree with it as they all try to answer the million dollar question: “When and in what way could the war be seen as a success?” This would essentially allow the US to immediately disengage from the Middle East. But the debate continues.

Thus, President Trump appears to have to “satisfy” with his decisions and statements, on the one hand, his economic staff which, as expected, is extremely negative about the possibility of the war dragging on for a long time.

Fear markets and pressure to “short trade”

The escalation of the conflict and especially the virtually complete closure of the Straits of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes, have provoked their strong reactions, as from the beginning they warned about this possibility and about the impact that the closure of the Straits would have on the price of oil, on the American and global economy.

Based on the reports, this group of advisers has been constantly pressing the US president to present the war as a military operation of limited scope and time frame, to declare the war a success and to pressure Iran through sanctions to sit at the negotiating table.

On the same side are political advisers, who are trying to “improve” the image of the conflict by pressuring the president to also present an image of victory and end the “short-term operation”.

The “hawks” are asking for escalation

On the other side, they have the “hawks” of war, from the main military wing, but also from the political scene. The group is pushing for a continuation of the war until it is clear that Iran cannot develop a nuclear program, Iran’s military power is effectively eliminated, and appropriate responses are made to Revolutionary Guard attacks on US forces and merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz.

Based on the developments, the latter group currently has the upper hand, as announcements from the Pentagon and Washington – such as sending more warships to the region, as well as about 5,000 marines – indicate an escalation.

In the American leadership and in political life, however, the war creates yet another rift, as it increasingly distances the supporters and personalities of the MAGA movement from President Trump.

War Pressure and Succession in Iran

A similar picture to that of the division in US political life prevails in Tehran. According to the information coming from Iran, but also from the movements and statements of officials of the political, military and theocratic leadership, the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is announced, but also the state of war itself is causing cracks in the power pyramid and a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has now taken over.

The selection of a conservative cleric for the supreme office of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, came as the power vacuum created by the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was being filled by the country’s president and reformer Massoud Pezeskian.

The Pezeskian clash with the hardliners

All this time, Pezeskian found himself to be the “face” of the Iranian leadership, with constant statements some of which the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards did not like at all, but also with appearances on the streets of Tehran, such as on Friday morning.

One of Pezeskian’s statements that angered the Guard and the hard-liners in the Iranian leadership was his apology to the Gulf countries for Iran’s attacks on them with ballistic missiles and drones, and he promised to try to avoid further strikes on them. The backlash was such that Pezeskian was forced to backtrack and then rework, essentially removing his apology from his related X post.

An impression was also made by another post by Pezeskian a few days later in which he claimed, among other things, that Iran could sign peace – the statements of the Guards and the hard-liners talk about the disappearance of the USA, Great Satanists and the like – if three conditions were respected: “the recognition of Iran’s “legal rights”, the payment of reparations and the provision of strong international guarantees”.

The Revolutionary Guards and real power

The most frequent projection of Pezeskian comes at a time when the Revolutionary Guards and their own leadership are doing everything they can to deepen the crisis even more and as many note, it also has a “propaganda” character that political life in Iran continues as normal and that it is “enduring”. On the other hand, of course, these small variations in the “line” as recorded by the intensity of the reactions probably hide something deeper than that.

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