The decapitation of the Iranian leadership by his extermination upset the balance within the regime. His election meant a strengthening of the House of .
As he is even said to be injured by the same attack that killed many members of his family, the real power seems to be located in a multitude of persons with the formation of new balances. In short, the Iranian regime appears to be turning from a kind of theocracy with a strong role for the senior clergy to something more like a military dictatorship under the Guards. In a sense it could even be argued that a regime change has already occurred. Only it is not certain how this is in a desirable direction.
The differences between the Revolutionary Guards and moderate politicians
The Iranian regime has often been popularly described as “the mullahs”, which is typically incorrect, as “mullahs” are junior clerics and scholars of religious traditions. The issue is that even if a certain “de-Mouladization” or “de-clericalization” of the Iranian regime has already been achieved, there seem to be tensions within the new situation between more hard-line senior members of the “Revolutionary Guards” on the one hand, and moderate politicians, such as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Massoud Pezhezkian, on the other. “Stronger of the day” appears to be Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is a political figure but has also been an important commander of the Guards in the 1980s and 1990s. In the Guards, the most important are Ahmad Vahidi, new head of the Guards after the extermination of Mohammad Pakpour, Mohammad-Bagher Zolgadr, new head of the Supreme National Security Council after the death of Ali Larijani, and General Yahya Rahim Safavi who is close to the Khamenei family.
It is recalled that the “Guards of the Revolution” are the body that has undertaken the protection of the political regime of the Islamic revolution. It is thus distinguished from the regular army, whose responsibility is the defense of the borders, while their interests as a body are often distinct from those of the clergy and politicians. The Guards have changed roles several times during the regime’s 47 years since 1979. At first, the consolidation of their corps was a necessity due to the fact that the first Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini did not fully control the military, where philistine elements remained. The Guards grew rapidly during the eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988) due to their appeal to unorthodox warfare. In peacetime, they developed into a pillar of the country’s economic life and into a state within a state. They were, however, preparing for the next encounter. In any case, the conditions of war strengthen them, as the Guards are the ones who control Iran’s “proxies” in the “proxy wars” in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere, the ones who cooperate underground with Russia and China, and, above all, the ones who develop the asymmetric war with ballistic missiles and drones. The regular army, in contrast, is more concerned with logistics and would have an increased role if full ground operations were to occur. These distinctions help us to understand why the conditions of asymmetric warfare strengthen the Guards against all other institutions, i.e. regular army, clergy, politicians and so on.
What are the reasons for the Iranian backsliding in the negotiations?
The tensions between different trends in the Iranian political system are illustrated by related contradictory moves by Iranians, which on the one hand almost mirror the antics of US President Donald Trump, but, on the other hand, may also have endogenous causes. On Tuesday, April 21, while Vice President Jay D. Vance was about to fly to Islamabad, Pakistan, for a new round of negotiations, the Iranians pulled out following the intervention of the Revolutionary Guards, who cited the US blockade around the Straits of Hormuz as an impediment to peace talks. It seems that both President Pezheskian and Foreign Minister Aragchi did not share the absoluteness of this perception of the futility of the peace talks and would probably wish for them to continue. It is significant, however, that the view imposed was that of the Revolutionary Guards and not the senior officials of the Islamic republic’s government.
Is Mojtaba Khamenei controlled by the Revolutionary Guards?
The question attributed to Henry Kissinger about “who picks up the phone” seems to hover over today’s Iran as well. For matters of war and peace once the ultimate authority would be Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Mojtaba’s son “inherited” by election the name of the title, but not the grace. In fact, it seems to function as a convenient religious form to transfer real power to the military of the Guard corps. After all, Mojtaba had fought with the Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), hence the connection with them. 17-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei’s enlistment in the Guards in the midst of war was a life-changing experience, and afterward the bonds he forged within the corps appear to be more important than his personal aura or prestige as a cleric and jurist. Mojtaba Khamenei’s reluctance to appear in public, to make his presence and voice felt, creates an even bigger gap that the Guards are filling, if the reports that he is wounded in the arms and legs and facially disfigured by the initial Israeli attack are true.
How unorthodox warfare empowers the Guardians at home
In fact, the fact that there are no ground operations so far, where the regular Iranian army would have a role, but only forms of unorthodox warfare, lead to the Revolutionary Guards having reached the peak of their power so far. The asymmetric warfare methodology, which is mainly the inspiration of the Guards, includes the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz, the strikes on the Arab monarchies of the Gulf in the form of an international “guerrilla war”, the attempt to maximize the overall cost of the war, the use of many hidden underground bases, etc. In this sense, the recent strikes on merchant ships in the Straits of Hormuz seem to bear the stamp of the Guards’ spirit. The extermination of Ali Khamenei, who indeed strengthened the Guards, but could set limits to them with his authority, shows that we are perhaps in a transition of the Iranian regime towards a kind of collective military junta, where both the religious institutions and those of the Islamic republic are certainly preserved, at least as outer shells, but weakened.
Fewer scarves, more check–points
This development may bring a relative secularization, which is a necessity for Iranian society, but also be combined with increasing political authoritarianism. Religious relaxation may possibly be achieved at the price of even greater political repression, in other words fewer headscarves, more check-points. The critical immediate issue is whether the Pezheskian-Aragchi duo (president and foreign minister) have lost their real ability to be important in negotiations with the US. The Guardians’ discrediting of “social media diplomacy” is not only a tip-off for President Trump, but also a wake-up call for Abbas Araghchi, who is being reminded not to place too much faith in the power of his online announcements. As e.g. when he had made a premature announcement of the opening of the Straits of Hormuz with an online posting, without having secured the agreement of the Guards.
The compositional role of Ghalibaf
At the present moment, Iran’s powerful negotiator seems to be not Aragchi, but Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is held in higher esteem by the Guards, having been a member of them. It seems that just as the regular army has been reduced to logistical matters, while the unorthodox war is waged by the Guards, similarly the politicians have been entrusted more with domestic affairs, while their negotiating dialogues are once again controlled by the Guards. Even when Aragchi formally takes over the talks, Ghalibaf’s stance is judged to be the decisive one. President Pezheskian, for his part, emphasizes the cost of the war, which has been reduced by his government to $300 million, and wants sanctions to be eased to allow for reconstruction. For the Guards, however, ensuring their survival is a priority.
Can the Trump administration capitalize on the developments?
Another critical question is whether US President Donald Trump and his entourage could capitalize on intra-Iranian developments. It is recalled that in Venezuela the tactic was chosen for the US to come to an agreement with the most “pragmatic” elements of the existing regime instead of seeking a total regime change, as during the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It’s true that the Revolutionary Guards don’t exactly have the religious weight of the ayatollahs, while many have now become businessmen who can potentially speak “Trabezika”. Problems remain, however, for an agreement. First, the Guardians are at the forefront of the unorthodox war that is causing all the headaches not only for the Trump administration, but also for the international economy. The tough stance on the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz is the most characteristic thorn. The power of the Guards is magnified by the fact that we are at war and an unorthodox war at that. Things would be different in a peaceful Iran or if there were fully developed ground interventions. Therefore, the option of unorthodox warfare may also work for the performative reproduction of the power of the guards. Secondly, the current split between the Guards and politicians undermines the credibility of negotiators, as if the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s “art of the deal” wasn’t enough already. The Trump administration would probably prefer to talk with military leaders of the regular army, but that is not appropriate given the makeup of the Iranian regime.
At stake here is the fate of Iran’s nuclear program and stockpile of enriched uranium, and this is where the hardliners may differ from the moderates. Ghalibaf, who is currently the strongman in the negotiations, appears to maintain a middle ground, stressing that Iran has achieved military successes but not defeated its adversaries, with the result that the role of diplomacy is to translate perceived military successes into a mutually beneficial agreement. In this way, without giving a sense of condescension, Ghalibaf moderates the enthusiastic voluntarism of part of the military establishment.
