The nomination of to the Supreme Court and the overturning, by Congress, of a law that eases punishments and directly benefits those convicted of January 8th, are not isolated episodes. They express the limits of a minority left-wing government in the face of a Congress with a center-right and right-wing majority.
And they reveal more: in moments of crisis and institutional self-protection, the ideological distance between the president and the legislative majority becomes even more costly. The case, with its political and judicial connections, worsens this situation by increasing incentives for defensive agreements between actors who have little interest in strengthening the Executive.
Studies on minority governments help to understand this impasse. Political scientist José Antônio Cheibub showed in his works that presidents without a legislative majority are not automatically condemned to paralysis. Their ability to govern depends on their position on the ideological spectrum and the distribution of preferences in Congress.
When the head of the Executive is close to the average parliamentarian, he can govern through “mobile majorities”: seeking support from the center-left for social agendas and the center-right for economic reforms.
When the president is far from the legislative majority, the cost of governance increases. The minority government is forced into a bitter choice: either capitulate ideologically, abandoning campaign promises to approve only what pleases the conservative majority, or try to assemble a coalition, handing over vital ministries and control of the budget to opponents in exchange for survival.
This appears to be the impasse faced by Lula, worsened by the threats arising from the Banco Master scandal. The case does not explain everything, but it increases the self-protection incentives of parts of the political system and reduces the willingness to reconcile with an already minority government. Bankruptcy encourages the search, as in Lava Jato, for a “grand agreement, with the Supreme Court, with everything”.
In this context, Messias’ nomination failed to produce the political signal that part of the Senate seemed to demand. His closeness to Lula, the signs that he would defend moderation in the actions of Supreme Court ministers and his support for André Mendonça in the case of Banco Master did not contribute to persuading the majority of senators to support his nomination.
The most recent voting intentions increase the pressure. When re-election seems threatened, allies move away, opponents raise the price of support, and Congress begins to anticipate future power. For part of the legislative majority, it may seem more rational to bet on the challenger, who is ideologically closer and who signals that he is willing to expand concessions to Congress, including giving up a seat.
A reminder for the October election: the vote for deputies and senators cannot be separated from the vote for president. Presidents do not govern alone. Without a legislative majority, the Executive loses its agenda, loses its veto and starts to manage defeats, no matter how many barbecues and lunches the Planalto is willing to offer.
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