Do fortuitous events that are unrelated to the actions of government officials — such as the performance of — influence the behavior of political agents? Democracy works when voters reward good rulers and punish bad rulers. But if citizens attribute responsibility to governments for events they do not control, the rationality of the democratic process is called into question. Autocrats mobilize successes in events to boost popularity, but their survival in office depends on brute force and abuse of power, not on elections.
The debate is polarized and began with a classic study of the 1916 American presidential campaign that concluded that a series of shark attacks off the coast of New Jersey had reduced electoral support for President Woodrow Wilson in the affected localities.
Negative events generate emotional responses – like when people take out the hardships of a disastrous day on their pet. His critics, but attention politics. Negative events displace positive items from the public agenda. And vice versa. Positive events cover up scandals. In cases of disasters there is the so-called “rally round the flag” effect (national unity), which can mitigate the negative effects. And also a second mechanism: the “limelight” effect: the disaster shines a light on the incumbent. This hyperfocus exposes incompetence or irregularities, magnifying wear and tear. In rare cases, the opposite occurs, and super-efficient behavior is rewarded. Thus, the intrinsic rationality in punishing and rewarding performance remains there. What changes is just the centrality of the issue on the agenda and/or window of attention.
The above effects are first order, but there are second order, indirect effects. Research has investigated the political consequences. Instead of analyzing voter behavior, Carvalho et al . Asset prices incorporate expectations about future events. If investors believe that a certain event changes electoral prospects, this information is reflected in the markets. After the 7 to 1, shares of companies seen as beneficiaries of a possible defeat by Dilma Rousseff showed strong appreciation. The expectation was that the disaster would increase the opposition’s chances in the presidential elections. The market, in other words, behaved as if millions of voters were going to hold the government responsible for a result produced within the four lines.
Defeats or success alter public sentiment. Victories generate the well-known “feeling good” effect, which reinforces the pro-status quo bias. Defeats trigger diffuse pro-change sentiment.
Among us, the evidence of a direct effect does not seem solid. In 2002, the incumbent candidate —Serra— lost the elections, . But the central question is the counterfactual: would the margin of defeat have been even worse without it? What is certain is that in the coming days the main effect will be to mitigate the impact of the sordid revelations of the Vorcaro scandal. And of course, the length of the attention window will depend on the performance of the selection.
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