Although Pedro Sánchez has been erected in the —on , on , on — for more than a year, the refusal to provide help to the offensive against Iran from the bases in (Cádiz) and Morón (Seville) marks a milestone in the . Above all, due to Trump’s forceful reaction, who this Tuesday went beyond the point he reached when he suggested Spain’s departure from NATO and threatened whose government Sánchez presides over.
So what had been announced so many times is now here: a high-voltage confrontation between the Trump Administration and the Government of Spain. How it will impact national politics is unpredictable. But two things are certain. The first is that Trump is a character who arouses widespread rejection, as polls show. One fact: only 15.7% of Spanish society has a good opinion of Trump, according to the CIS. The second is that the leaders of theoretically allied countries that have stood up to Trump in confrontation contexts have benefited at the polls or in the polls.

Is it logical to think that Sánchez will also take advantage of the clash? Political scientist Pablo Simón, professor at the Carlos III University, specialized in parties, electoral systems and participation, believes so, but with caution. “The typical adage ‘Soria before Syria’, according to which everything that happens outside of Spain has no importance inside, is no longer so clear. At the return of the summer, there was a slight recovery of the PSOE in the polls coinciding with a greater presence in the debate on the invasion of Gaza. Furthermore, with Trump, the effects of international politics on national policies are demonstrated, especially when there are conflicts. Look at Denmark, where the electoral advance [por parte de la primera ministra, la socialdemócrata ] “It occurs with those behind him,” he explains.
It is not the only example. The Canadian Prime Minister, the liberal Mark Carney, faced with Trump over tariffs and even a threat of annexation, brought forward the elections to April 2025, inconceivable with the polls in hand before the conflict with his powerful neighbor. Surveys in Mexico and the also indicate that .
Simón adds: “From the public opinion data, and from the background, it is clear that a confrontation with Trump constitutes a good opportunity for Sánchez to unite his electorate. For example, it is likely that the PSOE will attract votes from other left-wing forces. But, be careful, we are not facing a conflict as serious as those in Canada or Denmark. Here there has not been a threat of invasion of the Canary Islands, but rather a declaration that we do not yet know, because trade policy is carried out by the EU. Of course, we will have to be very attentive, because a conflict with Trump, depending on how it evolves, could be that white blackbird that offers Sánchez the opportunity to press the electoral button at a time conducive to his interests.”
The Carlos III professor points out that both the positions of the parties and public opinion will depend on how the war evolves in terms of its cost in human lives – the UN asked this Tuesday to investigate a girls’ school in Minab – and its impact on the economy, and also on what effects Trump’s possible retaliation will have. “If there are real negative consequences on the economy or security in Spain, the outlook will be complicated,” he analyzes.
Political consultant César Calderón, director of Red Lines, also believes that the clash with Trump could be “an opportunity, well, actually THE great opportunity” that remains for Sánchez to advance elections. Pedro Sánchez, this Tuesday Calderón on the Substack platform, “may have found in Trump’s outbursts the the casualty of war definitive that you need.”
“With all caution, in principle it is possible to think that Sánchez can benefit from an effect rally round de flag [también conocido como efecto bandera, la adhesión en torno al líder que genera la tensión con un agente externo]at least in the short term and especially among more left-wing voters. And it could also attract a now demobilized electorate that would react favorably to the decision to stand up to Trump. We have seen something similar in Canada,” observes political scientist and sociologist Tarek Jaziri-Arjona.
“Now,” adds the NGO researcher, “if Trump carries out his threats and they have an impact on the economy—for example, with more unemployment—or on the security of Spain, the social reaction could change.” Jaziri-Arjona points out that Sánchez has in his favor that, precisely as a result of the , the perception has grown that Spain must explore ways to reduce its dependence on the United States.
Negative feedback
The data shows that Sánchez faces an unpopular leader. Negative opinions about Trump are overwhelming. They are expressed by 76.5% of those surveyed by the CIS for its February barometer. The rejection is not homogeneous. Among the left, appreciation is at rock bottom. Only 3% and 3.8% of those who voted for the PSOE and Sumar in 2023, respectively, rate Trump favorably. On the other side of the ideological arc, the numbers improve. In the case of the PP, up to 23.8%, meaning that still less than a quarter have a good opinion of Trump in the main right-wing party. In Vox, positive opinions rise to 59.2%, a percentage that exceeds the majority but does not show on the extreme right a consensus as strong in favor of Trump as there is against him among those who voted to the left.
These data are accompanied by those from , a research center on the United States at the University of Alcalá, which in November detected that 67% of Spaniards have a negative view of Trump’s presidency. As in the CIS, there are differences between left and right. But, while among progressive voters the rejection is almost granite, in the conservative bloc there is some internal disparity. In data? 82% and 94% of PSOE and Sumar voters, respectively, suspend Trump. In the PP, the percentage of disapproval drops, but is still above half, at 57%. Vox’s electorate is once again the most favorable to Trump, but again far from unanimity: one in four see his presidency as bad or very bad.
“On the left, there is a historical anti-Americanism, which dates back to the US agreements with the Franco regime. [los pactos de Madrid de 1953]to which is now added a total rejection of Trump and his policies. The result is strong cohesion antiTrump. On the right, however, there is division. Overall, by opposing Trump, Pedro Sánchez aligns himself with majority public opinion,” says Pablo Simón.
The panorama that Simón describes is observed when asking if Trump is a danger to world peace. Around 95% of left-wing voters consider yes, but also 67.6% of those who supported Alberto Núñez Feijóo and almost 45% of those who took the Vox ballot, with data from February from the CIS. Even among voters of the far-right party, about half see him as dangerous.

These data match the growing perception that the United States is a threat to Spain. This is not a majority idea, but it has gone further. Between April 2024, with the White House, and June 2025, with Trump, it almost quadrupled, going from 5% to 19%, according to data from the barometer series.

Support to the bases
The Government’s decision on Iran adds to a portfolio of issues in which Sánchez has stood out within the EU due to his critical positions towards Trump. If the last was the attack on Venezuela in January, the one that had angered Trump the most—at least until now—was military spending. After reaching the agreement in June, Trump said he would make Spain “pay double” and suggested its expulsion from the alliance.
How did the street see that pulse? For the most part, he sided with Sánchez. According to a CIS survey during that episode, only 34.7% thought that Spain should accept. But, as always, political inclination influenced. Rejection of Trump’s demand was very high on the left, 85% among PSOE voters and 95.2% among Sumar voters, but low on the right, 22.3% among PP voters and 15.5% among Vox voters.
The majority rejection of Trump does not translate into a rejection of military bases. In the Franklin Institute survey, there are more interviewees with a positive opinion (36%) than a negative opinion (29%) of the American presence in Rota and Morón.

Although the assessment is mediated by ideology – the more favorable the further to the right – the general balance is favorable to the bases, perceived as a particularly sensitive element of the Spain-US relationship.