(PL)’s pre-candidacy has consolidated itself in the opposite camp to that of the president (PT) in this year’s presidential race, points out . The senator from Rio de Janeiro is close to the PT member in the first round simulations and is technically tied in the second round, scoring 43% compared to his rival’s 46%.
In the center right, the governor. (PR) is the best placed name among the three launched by , but very far from the front pack in the race.
The new research is the first carried out by the institute since Flávio was released from prison by his father, the former president. Initially received with skepticism, given the centrão’s preference for the governor (Republicanos-SP), the pre-candidacy was established.
Datafolha interviewed 2,004 voters in 137 municipalities from Tuesday (3) to Thursday (5). With a margin of error of plus or minus two points, the survey is registered with the Electoral Court under code BR-03715/2026.
Flávio’s crystallization is visible when the institute asks the voter’s spontaneous voting intention, without presenting names. It was not mentioned in the previous round, and now it appears with 12%. Lula fluctuated from 24% to 25%, and the next candidate mentioned is the ineligible Bolsonaro, with 3%.
Datafolha tested five scenarios for the first round election and seven for the second round. Lula remains ahead in all of them, but his advantage is falling.
In the first round, he always scores 38% or 39% — there is an unlikely scenario with Minister Fernando Haddad (Finance) as PT’s name, scoring 21% compared to Flávio’s 33%. The PL-RJ senator, in turn, fluctuates from 32% to 34% in clashes with Lula. Tarcísio, still tested, already drops to 21%.
In today’s most likely scenario, Lula has 38% compared to Flávio’s 32%. Ratinho Jr. comes next with 7% and the governor of Minas Gerais, Romeu Zema (Novo), with 4%. Then comes Aldo Rebelo (DC, 2%). 11% reject all candidates, and 3% say they don’t know who to vote for.
of uniting three PSD candidates and choosing one, for now, has not succeeded in threatening Flávio. Ratinho Jr. is doing better, in any case, than the governors (GO) and (RS).
In the second round dispute, it dropped from 15 to 3 points since December. The technical tie, but with a greater distance, occurs when the name in the second round is Ratinho Jr.: the president defeats the governor by 45% to 41%, in a stable scenario.
From the point of view of the leaders in the dispute, the profile of the electorate does not differ much from what was seen in the sharp polarization of the election from 2018 to now.
In the most likely scenario, with Flávio and Ratinho, the president maintains a homogeneous distribution between socioeconomic strata: northeasterners, Catholics, less educated people and those who earn less — in this segment, of those who earn up to 2 minimum wages, there is 42% (margin of error of three points).
Bolsonaro’s son stands out among evangelicals, southerners and residents of the North/Central-West, strongholds that were his father’s. Its best score, 48%, is in the top 28% stratum with a margin of error of four points.
Reinforcing the polarization is rejection. Accumulating almost three full terms, Lula scores 46% of people who say they would never vote for him. Flávio, on the other hand, arrives carrying the weight of his surname: 45% say they reject it outright.
Both are also widely known: only 1% have never heard of Lula and 7% of the senator. Here’s some good news for Ratinho Jr., who only has 19% rejection and 38% ignorance.
Contributing to the cloudy scenario for the PT member today are the sky of Brazilian politics. The scandal has spared the core of the government for now, but the perception of corruption ends up being placed on its account.
Furthermore, Alexandre de Moraes, seen as the ex-president’s tormentor for his role in the investigation and trial of the coup plot, favors Flávio. But only to a certain extent, given that so far Bolsonaro’s entourage is most cited in the case — starting with the former head of the Civil House Ciro Nogueira (PP).
Another scandal, that of , affects not only the government itself, but the president: he is increasingly embroiled due to his connection to a central character in the case, and Datafolha researchers were on their last day of data collection when the movement in his bank account emerged.
There are also economic uncertainties, to which are added the doubts surrounding the Middle East. Even though, as they say in Brasília, “the people don’t eat GDP”, in 2025, due to high interest rates, bitterness towards the government could increase, particularly in the middle class, whose family consumption has fallen.
More intangible factors also contribute, such as the fuss surrounding the tribute paid to the president during Carnival.
The fat accumulated in the second half of 2025, arising from the successful campaign for sovereignty, the achievement of American sympathy and Bolsonaro’s arrest, has dried up for now.
