When Aliomar Baleeiro published “The Federal Supreme Court, This Other Unknown” (1968), little was known about the institution. Today little is known about . But he has been in the police pages.
There is evidence that the TCU minister acted in collusion to pressure him into canceling the intervention in the Master. In Rio de Janeiro, five former councilors were removed and convicted for receiving bribes; one of them is in prison for the murder of . In Roraima, the minister’s homeland, two counselors lost their positions and were sentenced to 11 years behind bars.
The TCU is not a court. Saying that it is a jaboticaba is a cliché, but, in reality, there are few institutions in Brazil to which the expression applies. There is no international parallel equivalent to the Brazilian court of accounts. Around 45 higher control institutions, while 152 adopt other models (auditor general and auditors’ committees). The Brazilian model is unique.
The TCU is not a pure or stricto sensu jurisdictional court of accounts, as occurs in many European models. In other words, it does not directly hold political agents and managers responsible, as stricto sensu jurisdictional courts do. Its decisions are subject to judicial review, which raises questions about its effectiveness and decision-making authority, which impacts the speed of the processes: after the trial in the TCs, a case can be initiated in the Court itself.
The TCU is subordinate to the . Of the nine ministers, six are appointed by the Legislature; three by the president, two of whom must be an auditor or member of the accounts MP.
At the state level, four of the seven counselors are appointed by the Assembly, one freely appointed by the Executive (nine governors’ wives were appointed counselors, five of them are or were ministers in the current government). Dynastic and political incentives with interests of the Executive and/or the majority base in the Assembly are just one of the problems for the effective control of public accounts.
Control activity is, by definition, countermajoritarian. Saved in Brazil. In contrast to the auditor model in countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Canada or South Africa, the appointment of the auditor general is the responsibility of the minority, who also chairs the public accounts committee in Congress.
The courts have exceptional technical capacity —and the country has benefited from them—, but their decision-making structure reveals a permanent tension between the political leadership —subordinated to political logic— and its body of auditors, guided by professionalism. The population expects punishments and sanctions from the “courts” — which does not happen, although they are not toothless tigers (they can suspend bids and affect electoral eligibility).
Compliance measures do not lead to investigations that are typically carried out by the police and are unable to reveal complex corruption schemes. Their findings end up producing certificates of probity (judgments of accounts) that are, in reality, false negatives. System reform is knocking on the door.
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