Andrius Kubilius (Vilnius, 1956), Lithuanian physicist and politician, is the current European Commissioner for Defense and Space in the second von der Leyen Commission, and before that he was twice Prime Minister of Lithuania. Your portfolio has gained central weight at a time marked by the call to European rearmament with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war in the middle eastas well as the discussion about the relationship with the I’LL TAKE. This week he participates in Barcelona at the POLITICO and beBartlet European Pulse Forum.
How does the EU assess the situation with Iran?
It is always better to preserve peace than to allow an escalation with very serious consequences. We will see how events evolve. Personally, I would like to see Iran as a normal country, although I am not sure that what has happened so far is going in that direction. In any case, peace is essential. It would also be very important to secure agreements on maritime navigation, especially through the Strait of Hormuz, because that affects the whole world and, in particular, energy prices, which are a major concern.
How has the Ukraine war accelerated the EU’s defense priorities?
The war in Ukraine has been decisive. We are the main financial support of Ukraine, with more than 180,000 million community euros, and now we are preparing a new loan of 90,000 million, of which 60,000 million would go through my services for defense support. That package remains blocked by the Hungarian veto, although we hope that the situation may change.
Ukraine is not only defending itself, it is also defending us all. Different intelligence services believe that Russia could be preparing to test Article 5 of NATO and attack neighboring EU countries, such as the Baltics, Finland or Poland. That is why we are strengthening our defense capabilities: to deter and because we know we have a lot to learn from Ukraine.
What lessons should the EU draw from the war in Ukraine?
Ukraine has managed to resist, has acquired combat-tested military experience and has developed a highly innovative defense industry, also tested on the ground. The Gulf countries are a good example: they have asked Ukraine for help to defend themselves against Iranian drone attacks, because they have understood that the Ukrainians have very valuable capabilities in that area.
This shows that we, as Europeans, even closer to Ukraine and dedicated to its support, must also integrate this learning into our own defense capabilities. That is why we want to strengthen our relationship with Ukraine, support the integration of its defense industry with the European one and launch specific programs in that direction.
How to save the relationship between the EU and NATO in the face of Trump’s threats?
Our relationship with NATO is very close and rational. We must distinguish between Trump’s statements, often angry and unpredictable, and the long-term strategic messages we receive from the administration and American institutions, which are much clearer.
The US wants us Europeans to assume primary responsibility for the defense of the continent, because Washington plans to concentrate more and more resources in the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. In Europe, its role will be more secondary. That is the basis of what some call NATO 3.0. We understand that Europe must take much more responsibility for its own defense and, in doing so, strengthen NATO. That is what we are discussing with our transatlantic partners.
Do you detect contradictory messages between Trump and official US channels?
We see different messages, rather than contradictory ones. Trump has his own style for trying to achieve what he calls “agreements”: it is unpredictable, sometimes threatening, and it is part of his way of acting. Sometimes you get results; in others, it generates a lot of confusion, as happened with his statements about Greenland. We have to get used to living with this new normal. But we should not only look at Trump, but also at American institutions. Their language is different. Trump can say that NATO is no longer necessary, while the institutions say it is, but that the Europeans must step forward because the US will reduce its role. I wouldn’t say they are opposing messages, but they are different.
How do you interpret the fact that the US is both the main supplier of weapons to the EU and a promoter of European rearmament?
USA. It produces many high-quality weapons and, in some cases, systems that Europe does not manufacture, which is why the EU buys between 40% and 50% of its material from them. But now we have to develop our own production.
EU money should be used to help member states buy more European production. Americans have sometimes criticized him. But now we are facing a new situation: after the war with Iran, we see that the US industry will probably dedicate its production in the coming years mainly to replenishing its own arsenals and perhaps also those of its Gulf allies.
Trump is asking Congress for very important additional investments precisely because of the deficit in his reserves. That means that even if Europe wanted to buy more from the U.S., American industry may not be able to absorb that extra demand. This is not a dispute between allies, but a real shortage of production capacity.
What would you say to an EU country that prefers to buy quickly abroad, especially from the US, instead of waiting for European production?
I would tell you that even before the war with Iran, several European governments were already warning that the delivery times of the American industry were lengthening. And now that difficulty will be even greater. Therefore, it is foreseeable that more and more European countries will direct their purchases towards the European defense industry.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President Kaja Kallas and European Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius arrive in Brussels to attend a meeting of the College of Commissioners / OLIVIER HOSLET / EFE
How to convince those in Spain who see defense spending as a cut in the welfare state?
The Spanish do not differ much from the rest of Europeans in their support for Ukraine and greater investment in defense. The key seems to be more in political leadership. Polls show that many citizens, also in Spain, demand a stronger European defense: nearly 70% even support the idea of a European army. Leaders should hear that message.
Do you see it as a problem that the Spanish leadership sometimes goes in a different direction than most other European governments?
The problem arises when leaders stray from what their citizens want, and only voters can correct that. Although there are different positions in the EU, today it is clear that security and defense are priorities for Europeans. And policymakers must listen to that demand.
What do you say to those who fear that supporting Ukraine or rearming Europe will harm public education or healthcare?
My message is clear: supporting Ukraine and strengthening our defense costs money, but not doing so would cost much more. A Norwegian study compared two scenarios: if Ukraine does not receive enough support and Russia advances, the cost to Europe—through more refugees, a militarily stronger Russia and other consequences—could reach 1.5 trillion euros. In contrast, increasing aid to Ukraine now would cost three or four times less. In other words, investing in defense is expensive, but not being prepared can be much more expensive in money, suffering and security.
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