When the US president lands in Beijing in mid-May, impressions will matter more than results. The meeting with the Chinese president – originally scheduled earlier but postponed due to the war on Iran – has already revealed something essential: neither side could afford the cost of cancellation. In an era of heightened Cold War rivalry, both leaders need to show they can lower the geopolitical fever without appearing to make concessions.
The summit, however, is more than political theater. It is part of a deeper process that no joint communiqué can conceal: the gradual bifurcation of the international system into two incompatible orders of things.
On the one hand, a system centered on the United States and its allies; on the other, a system centered on China and its partners. What is at stake in Beijing is not just the management of a bilateral relationship. They are the terms of a new Cold War – a competition that extends from technology and trade to energy, shipping, financial networks and the very rules of the international system.
The agenda of the summit can be summarized in five axes: trade, technology, Iran, Japan and Taiwan.
Trade: Impressions without substance
Trade seems, at first glance, the easiest topic. It is also the most misleading. Trump is seeking a significant reduction in the trade deficit, but this is unachievable in a politically useful time frame. Beijing’s strategy — industrial primacy, import substitution and reduction of external dependencies — dual circulation strategy — moves in the opposite direction. China does not seek to buy more of the West, but less — and make the rest of the world more dependent on it.
The likely outcome is predictable: token purchases of energy, aircraft and agricultural products, temporary tariff freezes and declarations of progress. The tariff wall will remain. The announcements will be useful for internal consumption but will not constitute a substantial strategic change.
Technology: From Interdependence to Rivalry
If commerce is about impressions, technology is about power. US restrictions on exports of advanced semiconductors aim to block China from critical artificial intelligence infrastructure. Beijing has responded by leveraging its dominance of rare earths to drive up the costs of US technology restrictions.
Both sides have now come to the same conclusion: interdependence is no longer an advantage but a vulnerability. The planet is moving towards two parallel technological ecosystems — with different standards, different supply chains, different rules. No summit can reverse this momentum.
Iran: The shadow over the summit
Iran is not just another item on the agenda. It is the geopolitical context in which the summit is held. China is highly dependent on Persian Gulf energy flows. The Straits of Hormuz crisis highlighted this vulnerability and increased energy costs. Washington seeks to use Chinese influence in Tehran as leverage — in exchange for energy stability and tariff relief.
There may be limited convergence of interests here. But the geometry of the problem is triangular. China does not want a Tehran defeat that would weaken the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran Eurasian axis vis-à-vis the West. And here comes the sharpest standoff at this juncture: on May 2 — twelve days before the summit — Beijing invoked its new anti-extraterritorial jurisdiction law for the first time, issuing an order barring Chinese banks and companies from complying with U.S. sanctions against five Chinese refineries that supply Iranian oil. Washington considers these transactions illegal; Beijing considers them perfectly legal under international law. This is a conflict of principles that cannot be resolved at the negotiating table.
Japan: The thorn in US-China relations
Tokyo’s assertive stance under new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — accelerated rearmament, closer defense coordination with Washington, Seoul and Canberra — has deeply unnerved Beijing. Its importance lies not only in rearmament programs, but in the message it sends: a resisting Japan proves to India, Vietnam and the Philippines that balancing China is possible. This undermines the main Chinese pursuit — cultivating the perception that its dominance in Asia is inevitable. Xi is likely to call for American restraint vis-à-vis Tokyo. He is not going to receive it.
Taiwan: The Persistent Problem
At the heart of the US-China confrontation is Taiwan. For President Xi, reunification is a top strategic goal. For Trump, Taiwan is at once a credibility issue, a bargaining chip and a field for tactical maneuvers. Trump has already delayed $14 billion in supplies of US weapons systems to Taiwan — even announcing that he would discuss US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi, which sent shockwaves through Taipei.
Institutional checks and balances remain strong — American commitments have legislative enshrinement and bipartisan consensus. The “strategic ambiguity” that has governed American policy on the Taiwan question for decades has always been strategically expedient. But it becomes dangerous when ambiguity ceases to be intentional and begins to be unintentional.
Image and reality
On an image level, the meeting will be presented as a success for both sides. Trump will reinforce his image as the central negotiator of world politics. Xi will confirm that China remains an equal pole of power.
In substance, the results will be limited: trade arrangements, careful wording on technology, unclear messages on Iran, no progress on Japan and Taiwan.
The reason is structural. The United States and China are no longer negotiating within a common framework — they are competing to shape two different frameworks. The Beijing meeting will not be a turning point. It will confirm the transition to a bipolar world where competition is structural and increasing relative power remains the main concern of each side. The real question is not whether the two powers will continue to compete. It is whether they can manage their competition with restraint to prevent an uncontrolled escalation. By this criterion, even the summit taking place could be considered a success.
*THE Athanasios Platias is an emeritus professor at the University of Piraeus and President of the Council on International Relations
