The “new world order” of XI and Putin: how strong is the asymmetric alliance between Russia and China

Despite the rhetoric of proximity and the intensification of cooperation, the relationship between the two countries is marked by a growing asymmetry: Russia is increasingly dependent on China, while Beijing carefully chooses the extent to which it wants to support Moscow, preserving its own global interests.

Less than a week after Donald Trump, the Chinese leader, Xi Jinpinggave his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, a shout-out in Beijing.

Unlike Trump’s visit, this was a routine meeting. Chinese and Russian presidents met more than 40 times since 2013, with this latest meeting being Putin’s 25th visit to China.

A frequency of these meetings It is, in itself, proof of the expansion of common interests between the two States. And, as is customary at Sino-Russian summits, Xi and Putin signed, after the meeting, a set of documents in areas ranging from energy to higher education and the media.

Xi and Putin may be close, but their promises of greater cooperation are far from meaning that their friendship “has no limits”, writes Marcin Kaczmarskiprofessor of Security Studies at the University of Glasgow, in an article in .

A opposition to the global primacy of the United Statess has been the basis of Sino-Russian cooperation since the end of the Cold War. In a 1997 statement, the two countries condemned the “imposition on the international community of a unipolar global standard.”

Although without explicitly naming the United States, they also added that no country should monopolize international affairs.

Xi and Putin reiterated this message in Beijing. They adopted a declaration in which they committed to build a multipolar world order and a “new form” of international relations.

However, putting this rhetoric into practice has consistently proven to be a complex task. Moscow and Beijing have often chosen the easier and less expensive way to oppose the US, focusing mainly on block initiatives and geopolitical strategies supported by Washington, vetoing UN Security Council resolutions.

But fell short of launching any major joint effort to challenge American power, which became clear in the fall of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in January, as well as in the limited support provided to Iran in its war with the United States and Israel.

One of the reasons for this is the asymmetry in the ability to help each other mutually. Russia does not have the capacity to support China in the economic and technological domains, which are central to the Sino-American rivalry.

When it comes to overcoming tariffs imposed by the US on Chinese products, Moscow cannot offer Beijing either an alternative or great relief. The Russian market is neither rich nor attractive enough for Chinese companies, even before considering the possible impact of secondary sanctions.

Russia also has a limited ability to help Beijing circumvent US export controlsdesigned to restrict China’s access to advanced technologies, from semiconductor manufacturing equipment to artificial intelligence hardware.

As Western sanctions and repeated failures to modernize of the Russian economy caused the Russia fell behind in the technology race global. And, since 2022, Russia has been forced to depend on China for various technologies, from cars and laptops to 5G mobile networks.

China finds itself in a different position. It has political, financial and economic means to support the Kremlin in its confrontation with the West. However, committed to preserve your own interests global, Beijing is highly selective in the support it provides to Moscow.

A Chinese state propaganda echoes Russian arguments and repeats Moscow’s justification for the war in Ukraine, blaming the West and its “expansion” into former Soviet territories.

China also supplied Russia with chips and fiber optic cables, without which the Kremlin would not be able to sustain the war effort.

At the same time, however, China refrained from supplying lethal weapons to Russia. And the Chinese military, which conducts regular exercises with its Russian counterparts and conducts joint air and naval patrols around Japan and South Korea, does not participate in similar activities in Europe.

China also has consistently postpone your appointment end with the proposed Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which would transport more natural gas from Siberia to China, partially offsetting Russia’s loss of revenue in the European market.

Increasing asymmetry

It is evident that Beijing sets the pace and the areas of cooperation between the two countries. And the Russian leadership seems willing to accept this “minor partner” status.

In recent years, the Kremlin has sought to reconcile divergent interests between Russia and China, especially in Central Asia, rather than challenging Beijing. For example, Moscow remained silent regarding the presence of Chinese troops in Tajikistan, which was part of the former Russian sphere of influence.

It helps that the China act cautiously and make a substantial effort to create the illusion of equality between itself and Russia.

Despite the negative impact of Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine on Chinese plans to work with Kiev on the China-Europe rail transport corridor, e.g. Beijing refrained from criticizing Moscow’s conduct.

However, some Russians continue to see China as a threat. In recent years, several Russian scientists working on military programs have been arrested following accusations of espionage for China. The Russian Government itself is also deeply aware of its increasing asymmetric dependence in relation to Beijing.

Moscow has been nurture ties with other Asian statesincluding countries like India and Vietnam, which have historically had difficult relations with China.

Although China is an indispensable partner for Russia, Moscow appears wary of the possibility of Beijing dominates East Asia and the Indo-Pacific.