Now that the CNN received the full text of the draft agreement between the US and Iranwe can begin to evaluate its merits more fairly.
Of course, before the White House officially publish the text, which CNN received may not be the final version or may undergo changes. But we now know enough to evaluate the terms, and I will do my best to do so.
From the text we have seen so far, it is notable how much the USA they are offering in exchange for so little. I have negotiated difficult deals with Iran, and this document stands out for providing Iran with much of what it has demanded in the past—and rarely got.
Trump appears to have determined that a deal — any deal — was a better alternative to the status quo. In turn, Iran effectively maintained the Strait of Hormuz as a hostage and demanded that the US comply with his demands. The tactic appears to have worked.
In practice, the essence of this memorandum of understanding (MOU) is that Iran now receives a lot, including tens of billions of dollars, in exchange for not shooting at ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
Understanding the text
To understand how it works, we need to analyze what happens immediately after signing and what is planned for the future. Think of the agreement as two phases. THE Phase 1 start now and Phase 2 postpones everything else to be resolved in a “final agreement” to be negotiated over the next 60 days. This 60-day period may be extended by mutual agreement.
Now: Early US Concessions
with some articles referencing others — and some provisions focused on the future, while others apply immediately.
To understand what needs to be done now, see the Article 13. He states that, immediately after signing, the “Articles 4, 5, 10 and 11” of the Memorandum of Understanding must be in force. Therefore, these are the articles that apply now and must be in force even before the start of Phase 2 of the negotiations.
Let’s analyze them:
Articles 4 and 5 (Strait of Hormuz): According to these two articles, the United States lifts naval blockade and Iran removes obstacles (such as mines) to ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within the next 30 days.
If the deal stops there, it will be positive for the US and the global economy as it resolves the core problem of the strait, with both countries agreeing to allow ships to cross at pre-war levels.
But the deal doesn’t end there. In fact, this is where Iranian obligations end and American obligations begin.
Article 10 (exemption from sanctions): According to this article, the United States “immediately upon signing…will grant exemptions for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and similar services.”
This is a significant concession. At first glance, she returns Iran to the status it enjoyed under the Obama era (the JCPOA), with unlimited sales of oil and petrochemical products at market prices. Some energy experts have already estimated that this article alone would yield between US$60 and US$70 billion per year directly to Iran.
This represents a spent 60 to 70 billion of dollars to do nothing but reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which was already open before the war.
Article 11 (frozen funds): This article is complex, a piece within another puzzle. It says: “The United States commits that… the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made available in full.” Within this reticence, the text says “in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement”.
This could be interpreted as a caveat to the release of funds in exchange for Iran’s performance in the 60-day negotiations for a more permanent agreement.
But let’s remember the Article 13: These 60-day trades do not begin without “implementing” this article regarding frozen funds. Therefore, the frozen funds must be dealt with in some way now and perhaps even before Iran is forced to comply with its cross-strait demands.
Another important point is that this article states that the central bank of iran can determine the beneficiary of the funds once they are released. This is completely different from other agreements with Iran — such as the hostage rescue agreement in 2023 — that made these funds available exclusively to unsanctioned beneficiaries (such as humanitarian goods).
While the wording could certainly change, I don’t recall any agreement, other than the JCPOA, that simply released Iran’s frozen assets to any designated beneficiary of the country.
Long-term provisions
Has Iran made any new long-term commitments to the United States in exchange for these concessions? From the text we have, this does not seem to be the case.
Article 8 (nuclear weapons): According to the text received by CNNo.
Trump is spreading this article as if prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. But the text of the Obama-era JCPOA was more incisive: “Iran reaffirms that it will under no circumstances seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.” This is not a political issue. It’s a fact. The language about nuclear weapons it is not new and, in fact, is more lenient than the one the United States had in the agreement that Trump abandoned during his first term.
To be fair, the Trump administration destroyed much of Iran’s nuclear program, and the memorandum of understanding guarantees the maintenance of the status quo during the 60 days of negotiations. Iran is not in a position to develop an atomic bomb, and its initial situation is much worse than under the Obama administration.
But the memorandum of understanding, in its current form, does not chart the path to a broader and more permanent agreement. On the contrary, it makes this path more difficult, given the relief granted to Iran initially.
As for nuclear material and the nuclear program itself, these matters “will be duly addressed in a final agreementIn other words, Iran has made no commitments on these issues.
Article 9 (reconstruction fund): This is the much-discussed $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran. The Memorandum of Understanding does not establish such a fund immediately, but requires the United States, “together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan, agreed to by both parties, for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while ensuring financing of at least $300 billion.”
This plan should be “formulated in 60 days” and will be part of a final agreement with Iran.
To make it clear what this means: there will be no “final deal” without a $300 billion reconstruction fund. Iran will not agree to nuclear commitments or anything else unless this fund is a reality. That’s certainly how they interpret Article 8, and that’s exactly what Article 8 says. Without the fund, there will be no agreement.
Article 7 (all sanctions): This is perhaps the most important article and will make negotiating a long-term deal quite difficult. It states: “The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran.” It then lists the sanctions of the UN Security CouncilInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions and “all unilateral US sanctions, both primary and secondary”.
Tehran will take this for what it says: the United States has committed to lifting all (emphasis on “all”) sanctions against Iran — for terrorism, missiles, human rights, drones, weapons proliferation, etc. — as part of a “final agreement” on the nuclear program. This goes beyond anything the US has ever done or offered in the past.
To justify such a measure by the United States, Iran presumably would need to renounce its support for terrorism and completely change the essence of the Islamic Republic. It is difficult to imagine the United States lifting all sanctions just in exchange for nuclear measures. But the memorandum of understanding, in its current form, provides only for a final nuclear agreement.
There is absolutely nothing in this text about Iran’s support for terrorist groups, human rights violations against its own people, plans to assassinate Americans, its missile and drone program or its allies throughout the Middle East region.
As for the IAEA, the Iran claims to have received a clean bill of healthdespite its well-known weapons development program. This shouldn’t be up for discussion. Iran had a weapons program. Everyone knows that. Iran did not admit it. Until you do this, there is no certificate of health.
End of the war
Finally, the memorandum of understanding intends to establish “one on all fronts, including Lebanon” and commits the United States and Iran not to use force — or threaten to use it — against each other.
Trump may have already violated that provision when, at the G7 summit in France, he said today about Iran and its future behavior: “If I don’t like it, we’ll go back to shooting at them, dropping bombs right in the middle of their heads.”
In any case, stating on paper that a war in the Middle East ends without any commitment from Iran to cease support for terrorist groups that foment war in the region (including Hezbollah in Lebanon) does little in practice. As long as Hezbollah is concentrated in Lebanon and firing at Israel, Israel will fight back to defend itself. The path to ending the war in Lebanon passes through Israel and Lebanon, not through Tehran.
As for the Iranian people, the The United States has now committed to non-interference in Iran’s internal affairswhich Iran will interpret as the end of sanctions against human rights violators or those responsible for the murder of innocent Iranians in the streets. Iran will approve this provision. It is foreseen in the Article 2with nothing in return from Iran.
It’s unlikely to last long
Based on this text and what we know about Iran’s negotiating strategy as well as its behavior in the Middle East and globally over 47 years, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to move beyond this memorandum of understanding unilaterally to a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear program or any other matter.
The United States appears to have ceded much of its influence in exchange for opening the Strait of Hormuz. And as these negotiations drag on or reach an impasse, the peace that the memorandum of understanding aims to establish may not last.
