The analysis of the origins of parliamentary control of public accounts —which took place during the English Civil War (1642-1651)— is particularly intriguing due to its symbolism. The demands for control and transparency were led by William Prynne, an opposition member of Parliament. Prynne had her ears cut off as punishment for her audacity in holding the government accountable, as reported by Jacob Soll in “The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nation.” But he survived. The one who didn’t survive was the king whose head was cut off.
The dynamics triggered by this event led to the establishment of a commission to audit the accounts of the British crown. This model was extended to all countries in the so-called commonwealth. The most important thing about this model: control rests with the parliamentary minority. She is also the one who appoints the auditor general. Only parliamentary minorities have incentives to control the government. As I have shown, majorities typically are committed to the government itself and have incentives to undermine control activities. This applies to CPIs and higher control institutions (ISC). Our ISCs —o and TCEs— . They are called courts but the judges of their collegiate (ministers or counselors) do not have law degrees, and can be businessmen, farmers, pedagogues or nurses (this is the case of minister Rui Costa’s wife).
Similar to the auditor general models, the technical body prepares preliminary opinions on the government accounts that are rejected or approved by this panel and are finally sent to the legislature, which has the final say. It is the legislative majorities that hold those responsible accountable or not. Minority mayors and governors are vulnerable; the majority have guaranteed impunity. Nothing similar happens in democracies that adopt the auditor general model.
And that’s not all: the rejection of bills has crucial political implications: they can lead to ineligibility. The minority status of mayors and governors means in practice that they can be excluded from the political game simply by rejecting bills. And vice versa: the legislative majority can guarantee continuity of the game regardless of whether or not irregularities have been committed. In a municipality in Pernambuco, a session of the City Council that included cheering from the rival political group and fireworks in celebration of the measure. “If you think about it, the mayor who loses the election may never be a candidate again. Because whoever is in power normally has the majority in the Chamber and will vote to reject the former’s bills. So, it really is a power that needs to be limited.” The correct conclusion was reached by a councilor from the municipality.
That legislative majorities are enemies of control is nothing new. The greatest evil is when the enemies of control are the controllers themselves. It’s the canonical problem of who keeps the guardians. In this case, what we have is the controllers themselves “cutting off the ears” of Republican minorities. Who knows, they might not have the same luck as the king.
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