This was an important week for us to become even more concerned about nuclear weapons.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the test of
President Donald Trump responded by calling on the US to resume nuclear weapons testing.
Neither country has carried out nuclear tests since 1990, and Russia was quick to clarify that Putin has not announced new nuclear tests. During a trip to Asia, Trump did not meet with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who rejected demands for his country to denuclearize.
North Korea is one of the potential villains in a fictional nuclear war film on Netflix, “A House of Dynamite,” by Kathryn Bigelow. It’s a “Rashomon”-style thriller about the concept of mutual assured destruction that the filmmakers intend to be a warning to nuclear powers.
The Pentagon felt the need to draft a memo in response to the film’s depiction of US missile defense systems as inherently flawed – as “trying to hit a bullet with a bullet” is the phrase repeated throughout the film.
The film’s director, Noah Oppenheim, told CNN’s Jake Tapper that he welcomes the criticism, as the film’s intention was “to invite a conversation about an issue that we consider extremely important and that doesn’t get enough attention, which is the fact that we have all these nuclear weapons that exist in the world and that represent a great threat to all of humanity.”
There is more talk of nuclear weapons to come. A treaty between the US and Russia to limit the size of nuclear arsenals expires in February and, for now, there is no indication that the treaty will be extended.
The Trump administration’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have damaged the country’s nuclear capabilities but likely have not completely destroyed them.
There is new tension this week between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers.
CNN spoke again with Matthew Fuhrmann, a professor at Texas A&M University who has written extensively about nuclear weapons and disarmament, including in the books “Influence Without Arms: The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence” and “Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy,” with Todd S. Sechser. Our last conversation with Matthew Fuhrmann was around the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when nuclear threats were also in the news.
Our conversation about this week’s events, conducted via email and edited for length and style, is below:
What do Putin and Trump mean by “nuclear test”?
WOLF: Both Trump and Putin referenced nuclear testing this week, but neither the US nor Russia should have tested nuclear weapons since the 1990s. What did you think of Russia’s test and the US response? Is this the kind of coercive diplomacy you wrote about, or is it something else?
CARTER: Firstly, it is important to clarify what we mean by “nuclear test”. Russia has tested missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. But in the traditional sense, a nuclear test is the detonation of a nuclear explosive device. Think of the July 1945 Trinity test in the New Mexico desert, which you may have seen depicted in the 2023 film “Oppenheimer” (although after the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, most nuclear explosive tests were conducted underground rather than in the atmosphere). That’s not what Russia did, and I don’t believe that’s what the US is threatening to resume.
There are two main reasons why countries test military technologies. The first is to verify that a weapon functions as intended. The second is to send a political message to other countries. I think there is a certain amount of signaling associated with Russia’s recent missile tests. While it is difficult to decipher Moscow’s intentions, by testing these technologies, the Kremlin may be implicitly saying to the United States and NATO: Back off in Ukraine — see what we can do if they continue to interfere.
More worried about a nuclear crisis today than four years ago
WOLF: In general, do you think the threat of a nuclear standoff has increased in recent years?
CARTER: I am more concerned about the possibility of a serious nuclear crisis today than I was at the end of 2021. This is largely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the possibility of Moscow continuing to wield its nuclear arsenal to help prevail in that war. But that’s not all. The possibility of a nuclear standoff between the US and China over Taiwan is not trivial, especially if one side misinterprets the other’s determination to fight. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are also expanding, and there is the potential for disaster on the Korean Peninsula due to an accident or miscalculation. Not to mention the possibility of a crisis with nuclear connotations between India and Pakistan. This does not mean that the probability of a stalemate is high. In fact, I still think it’s relatively low. But given what’s at stake, even a small increase in risk—say, 2%—is cause for concern.
Do US missile defenses work?
WOLF: Coincidentally, there is a film on Netflix about the 30 minutes it would take for an intercontinental ballistic missile to reach the US and the difficulty of intercepting such a missile. The Pentagon felt the need to produce a memo in response to the film. Are missile defense systems better than the “lottery” suggested by the film?
CARTER: I haven’t seen the film yet. I’ll leave that question to the technical experts who understand the intricacies of missile defense systems better than I do. I would say that, from a strategic perspective, there is value in convincing adversaries that their missile defense systems are impenetrable. This can strengthen deterrence: If adversaries believe their missiles won’t get through, they may be less likely to fire them.
Would Trump’s Golden Dome solve the nuclear threat?
WOLF: Trump (inspired by Project 2025) called for a new missile defense shield called the “Golden Dome.” Is it worth the cost and would it help resolve the nuclear threat?
CARTER: This is a complicated issue. At first glance, missile defense looks great — and in some ways, it is. Consider, for example, the relatively high rate at which Israel was able to shoot down missiles launched by Iran in the war between the two countries over the summer. However, in the long term, the development of these systems could encourage adversaries to develop technologies that bypass their defenses or to develop their own missile defenses. In the end, it could result in a costly arms race that leaves both sides worse off. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized this during the Cold War, and it was one of the reasons they agreed to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Will the expiring Obama-era nuclear treaty be renegotiated?
WOLF: The US and Russia have a nuclear weapons treaty that expires in February. New START, negotiated during the Obama administration, limits the size of countries’ nuclear arsenals. Will it be renegotiated?
CARTER: The outlook currently looks bleak. As long as there is tension over the war in Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine Russia agreeing to a new arms control agreement with the United States. If that tension is eased, the prospects for a deal would improve.
What about China?
WOLF: Should China or other countries be part of this process?
CARTER: Many US politicians would like to include China in an arms control agreement with Russia. The problem is that China’s nuclear capabilities currently lag behind those of Russia and the United States. Countries generally do not like to negotiate from a position of weakness. As China’s nuclear arsenal expands — a trend that is happening — a trilateral agreement becomes more likely, especially if Beijing achieves parity with the other two countries.
Bring back the test ban treaty?
WOLF: Bill Clinton helped negotiate the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the 1990s, but couldn’t get the U.S. Senate to ratify it. Trump isn’t talking about reviving it, but if the president could get the few nuclear powers that haven’t also ratified the test ban treaty — including China, Russia, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel — to ratify it, would Trump be a sure candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize?
CARTER: The U.S. Senate’s vote on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1999 was a setback for global nonproliferation. There are obstacles to the CTBT coming into force in the current political environment. If the Trump administration could pull this off, it would be a major foreign policy achievement.
