He has the final say on the war in but he will not accept a settlement that would leave the stockpile of enriched uranium in the hands of the regime, estimates the respected Israeli analyst Eitan Shamir.
In his interview with Vima, shortly after , Professor Samir makes an “x-ray” of Israel’s strategy in Iran and Lebanon.
Eitan Samir
Eitan Shamir is director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and former head of the strategic doctrine formation department in the Israeli prime minister’s office.
What is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan for Iran? Does Israel have an exit strategy?
In the Iran war Israel is the minor partner. Despite claims to the contrary, the final decisions are made in Washington, specifically by the American president. For Israel a successful conclusion of the war depends on many important conditions. First, any American decision to end hostilities must not leave Israel strategically exposed—especially a scenario in which Washington declares victory and withdraws unilaterally, forcing Israel to face Iran alone.
Such an outcome would fundamentally undermine Israel’s position. Second, from the Israeli point of view, it is not a necessary condition for success. The barely acceptable result is the substantial downgrading of the nuclear and missile programs, as well as the significant downgrading of the economic and industrial base. Since Iran was already on the brink of an acute economic crisis before the war, it stands to reason that it will take a long time to recover, thus creating a window of strategic opportunity for Israel – even if the regime survives.
However, the central unresolved issue concerns the stockpile of around 440 kilograms of enriched uranium. If the war ends with the regime intact and in possession of this material, Iran could build, very quickly, many nuclear devices. This is an unacceptable scenario for Israel. Consequently, an arrangement that leaves both the regime and enriched uranium in place will not be sustainable, so hostilities will probably have to continue. Under the current circumstances, it appears that Washington understands these limitations.
How will the invasion of Lebanon develop, where will it stop and how is it connected to the war in Iran?
For Lebanon, Israel’s strategy reflects structural constraints and pragmatic accommodation. Under the most recent cease-fire settlement, Israel gave the Lebanese government the opportunity to disarm Hezbollah. However, this expectation turned out to be unrealistic. and weak state institutions cannot counter a deeply entrenched non-state actor with significant military and social power.
After the outbreak of hostilities with Iran, Hezbollah resumed attacks against Israel, prompting Jerusalem to seize the opportunity to further degrade the organization’s military capabilities.
Israel’s operational logic is not for a decisive solution in the short term, but for a strategy of sustained attrition – what is often described as “mowing the grass” – aimed at keeping Hezbollah’s capabilities at a manageable level until broader regional conditions, especially a greatly weakened Iran, change the strategic balance.
In this context, Israel is likely to maintain control of strategically important heights within Lebanese territory in order to ensure tactical advantage and prevent the effective deployment of Hezbollah. At the same time, efforts to evacuate specific Shiite villages along the border—in direct or indirect ways—are intended to limit Hezbollah’s ability to hide in populated areas and use them as cover. The overall goal is not the immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, but its containment and operational weakening.
