I completely understand that you want to believe it was a success. We all want to hear good news about public safety.
But it wasn’t this time.
The name of the operation, “Containment”, may give the wrong impression. The goal was never to prevent the conquest of areas of the city that are currently free from organized crime.
The objective of the operation was to prevent the Red Command from continuing to take over areas in the Jacarepaguá region that are currently controlled by the militias.
I imagine the authorities have a good explanation for this. Would it be to prevent the CV from gaining control over the whole of Rio, as the (Primeiro Comando da Capital) does in São Paulo? Perhaps.
The conflict between factions prevented a stable and centralized faction like the PCC from emerging in Rio. On the other hand, poor people from Rio de Janeiro suffer much more from bloody gang wars than poor people from São Paulo. It is difficult to know which of the two conditions is worse.
In any case, it’s good to keep this in mind: the operation was never intended to free Alemão’s territory from the yoke of criminals. This was the objective of the UPPs (), for example.
Castro didn’t do a UPP, he didn’t do an occupation, he didn’t do anything. Once the operation was over, the police left and left the residents there, searching for their dead in the middle of the forest and paying the same fees extorted by Comando Vermelho.
The only thing that may have changed as a result of Tuesday’s operation is that it may have increased the likelihood of people from Jacarepaguá continuing to be extorted by the militias, instead of being extorted by Comando Vermelho.
In an interview with UOL, former BOPE (Special Operations Battalion) officer Rodrigo Pimentel suggested that the Lula government take the opportunity to occupy Alemão.
It would be great, but this should have been planned before the invasion, as it was during the time of the UPPs. And Cláudio Castro’s party would work in Congress, as it has been doing for months, so that Lula would not have the money to do anything important in an election year.
Well, you might say, “But even if the operation didn’t have any long-term effects, at least the police arrested the drug dealers they wanted to arrest, right?”
Neither.
Cláudio Castro invaded Complexo do Alemão on court orders to arrest 100 Comando Vermelho criminals. Of the 100, he arrested 20, but none of them were on the list of people that Cláudio Castro went to arrest.
The main target of the operation, drug trafficker Doca, .
Soon after the operation, Castro embarked on politicization. He needed to hide his failure. He knew that if he cursed Lula for any reason (the story about the armored vehicles, by the way, was a lie), the Bolsonaristas would make the noise he needed to hide the fiasco.
So far, it’s been working. The failure of the arrests only became clear when the prisoners and the dead were officially identified, several days after the invasion. The climate of euphoria surrounding the killing was already established.
The group that until the other day said that hiccups are grounds for house arrest were already celebrating deaths without the right to trial. Like Comando Vermelho, Bolsonarism continues to function.
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